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Strategic Incentives for Pillar Two Adoption
Wei Cui, University of British Columbiai
(For updated versions, go here)
Abstract: I analyze countries’ strategic incentives for adopting elements of the OECD’s Pillar Two
proposal for reforming international taxation. I treat the three components of Pillar Two—the Income
Inclusion Rule (IIR), the Under-Taxed Profits Rule (UTPR), and the Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-Up
Tax (QDMT)—as independent of one another. Countries are assumed to make strategic decisions about
whether to adopt each component simultaneously with other countries facing similar choices, each
aiming to maximize its own objectives.
I argue that although Pillar Two’s designers aimed to maximize strategic interactions among
participating countries, overall, remarkably few incentives for adoption emerge. In particular, contrary
to what many have supposed, there is no revenue or other conventional incentive for adopting the
UTPR, and certain unusual ideological motives are needed. Further, neither QDMT nor IIR adoption is
necessarily a rational response to the UTPR, therefore even assuming specific ideological motives, UTPR
adoption incentives may be lacking. I also show that no IIR adoption incentives arise from the apparent
competition among parent jurisdictions to apply IIRs, and because Pillar Two designers implicitly
postulate mutually incompatible incentives—sometimes countries are assumed to be national-incomemaximizing and other times not—IIR and QDMT adoption incentives are indeterminate.
Overall, the narrative perpetrated by proponents of Pillar Two, that a country that fails to adopt the IIR,
UTPR, or QDMT would be leaving “money on the table,” is unfounded. Moreover, this narrative—that
countries should adopt Pillar Two as a defensive measure so as to prevent other countries from
predating on their tax bases—is in obvious tension with the OECD’s previous efforts (especially before
the October 2021 political statement) to cast Pillar Two as a cooperative endeavor.

Introduction
In October 2021, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
announced an agreement among over 130 countries on a “Two Pillar” proposal to reform international
corporate income taxation.1 In 2022, the OECD and the key sponsor nations of the agreement turned to
its “implementation”. Pillar Two of the 2021 global tax deal—a proposal for a “global minimum tax”—is
said to have made the greatest advance in such implementation.2 In this paper, I lay out a conceptual
i
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scheme for understanding countries’ incentives for adopting elements of Pillar Two (also known as the
Global Anti-Base Erosion or GLoBE rules). Specifically, I assess certain claims that have been made
regarding the design of the GLoBE rules, to the effect that the rules contain novel enforcement
mechanisms that increase incentives for countries to adopt them.3 The basic question the paper seeks to
answer is: does Pillar Two offer incentives that increase the likelihood of its adoption?
In my analysis, Pillar Two has three distinct components: the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR), the
Under-Taxed Profits Rule or UTPR, and the Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-Up Tax (QDMT). I treat the
three components as independent: any component(s) may be adopted without the other(s). I present
countries as deciding whether to adopt (any of) them simultaneously with other countries facing similar
choices. Countries are assumed to act strategically: each tries to maximally achieve its own objectives,
given the expectation that other countries will act the same way.
My analysis therefore proceeds as though no country, at the beginning of 2022, was required to
adopt any of the components of Pillar Two, notwithstanding the fact that, in October 2021, 137
countries in the OECD Inclusive Framework agreed to a political statement. For many observers of the
OECD process, this premise simply describes reality: until some more definitive agreement is entered
into (e.g. with at least signatures by participating countries, if not ratifications by domestic legislatures),
Pillar Two is not legally or otherwise binding on any country.4 This understanding was in fact explicitly
expressed by some countries actively preparing for Pillar Two implementation.5 Nonetheless, many
commentators express the contrary view that the issue of whether some version of Pillar Two will be
widely adopted is settled (“the train has left the station.”). But regardless of how one interprets
commitments implied by the OECD October 2021 Statement, it is notable that, in trying to persuade
reluctant countries to join in 2022, many political leaders advocating for Pillar Two implementation
frequently appeal to national self-interests. They often speak as though the global minimum tax, once
properly understood, is something that would be irrational not to adopt.6 This suggests a self3
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4
See, e.g., Scott Wilkie, Next Steps for the OECD Pillars: Moving From a Political Deal to an Enforceable Law, 104
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6
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to implement the IIR before other countries implement the UTPR, it will lose tax revenue to such other countries);
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understanding among Pillar Two designers that the best argument for its adoption is not that a failure to
adopt breaches some recent international agreement, but that it would go against enlightened selfinterest. It is this understanding that this paper aims to probe.
It should be emphasized that understanding Pillar Two adoption incentives is critical from a
social scientific perspective. Even if countries both agreed to and actually implement Pillar Two, why
they do so still require an explanation. Without such an explanation, any social scientific examination of
international taxation in the aftermath of the 2021 global tax deal would need to take an entirely
unprecedented and unanticipated regime that emerged in 2021 as given. This seems obviously
unsatisfactory. Yet at this point, no such explanation has been attempted. My goal is to investigate
whether such an explanation may have anything to do with the design of the GloBE rules, when
countries are assumed to act strategically in their self-interests.
Overall, the paper concludes that while Pillar Two’s designers aimed to maximize strategic
interactions among participating countries—with rules that incentivize countries to compete to apply
IIRs and UTPRs, to use UTPRs to incentivize IIR and QDMT adoption, and to encourage QDMT adoption
in reaction to IIRs—remarkably few incentives for adoption emerge. Specifically, the main findings
regarding Pillar Two’s three components are:
1. Contrary to what many have supposed, there is no revenue or other conventional incentive for
adopting the UTPR, and certain unusual ideological motives are needed. Moreover, neither
QDMT nor IIR adoption is necessarily a rational response to the UTPR. Therefore, even assuming
specific ideological motives, strategic considerations do not favor UTPR adoption because it
cannot be expected to be effective in bringing out the desired outcomes.
2. With respect to IIR adoption, Pillar Two promoters increasingly appeal to two mutually
incompatible kinds of incentives. Countries are sometimes assumed to maximize national
income, but Pillar Two design has weakened the incentives for such countries to implement IIRlike rules. At other times, countries are assumed not to maximize national income, but the
strength of alternative motives is unclear.
3. Whether QDMT adoption is a rational response to the IIR depends on why countries adopt the
IIR: ambiguity regarding IIR adoption incentives therefore also renders QDMT adoption
incentives indeterminate. Moreover, QDMT adoption is generally not a rational response to the
UTPR.
A direct implication of these findings is that the narrative, suggested by many commentators on
Pillar Two, that a country that fails to adopt the IIR, UTPR, or QDMT would be a “sucker” or leaving
“money on the table,” is unfounded. Further, if, in the next two years, countries proceed to adopt Pillar

on the table for other countries to collect if you don’t adopt Pillar Two.”); Elodie Lamer, Pillar 2 Needs a First
Mover, Saint Amans Says, TAX NOTES (June 14, 2022), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-todayinternational/corporate-taxation/pillar-2-needs-first-mover-saint-amans-says/2022/06/14/7dkm7 (Director of
OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration Pascal Saint-Amans cited as explaining adoption incentives as “if
somebody just grabs the tax — your tax — well, you will not let it go. You will act yourself.”)
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Two, the reasons they do so may be attributed to the intrinsic attractions of Pillar Two’s goals,7 or
aspects of the political process by which the agreement on Pillar Two is reached,8 but not to purported
incentives arising from Pillar Two’s design. It would not make sense, for instance, to interpret countries’
QDMT adoption as a rational response to the risk of UTPR adoption, if such a response is demonstrably
not rational. At the same time, if the process by which countries come to agree to Pillar Two
implementation is very idiosyncratic, any success achieved by Pillar Two may also not be easily
generalizable to other international agreements.
This paper contributes to the emerging legal and economic literature on the 2021 OECD tax
agreement by filling important gaps. In particular, the adoption incentives for the components of Pillar
Two have yet to be systematically studied. Several recent papers by economists assume that low-tax
source countries will raise CIT rates in reaction to IIRs, and examine the welfare properties of such rate
increases.9 These normative analyses do not examine IIR (or UTPR) adoption incentives, and therefore
depict a landscape of international taxation that emerges from a deux ex machina transformation.
Arguably, such analyses eschew any explanatory ambition.10 Some legal scholars have suggested that
QDMT adoption may be a rational response to IIR and UTPR,11 but they do not analyze the incentives for
IIR or UTPR adoption, and therefore implicitly take IIR or UTPR adoption as given. By contrast, this paper
does not take the adoption of any of the Pillar Two components as given, and shows that QDMT
adoption incentives may depend on the nature of IIR adoption incentives.12 Finally, assuming that
countries react to IIR adoption strategically, some have argued for alternative designs for the IIR, taking
its objectives as given.13 This paper applies the assumption of strategic interactions among nations more
broadly to illuminate adoption incentives for all three components of Pillar Two, including the IIR itself.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I illustrates the IIR, UTPR and QDMT
components of Pillar Two with a basic stylized example. Section II then examines the adoption incentives
7

For an evaluation of the intrinsic appeal of Pillar Two as an agenda for international tax cooperation, see Wei Cui,
New Puzzles in International Tax Agreements, forthcoming in TAX LAW REVIEW (2022).
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It may be relevant, for example, that Pillar Two agreement process is dominated by tax administrators and
finance bureaucrats, as opposed to politicians in normal domestic legislative procedures. See discussion in Section
V. Although these alternative explanations are not standard fare in positive explanations of international taxation,
their relevance is enhanced by analyses that show that conventional assumptions of Nash-optimization fail to
explain observed behavior.
9
See Eckhard Janeba & Guttorm Schjelderup, The Global Minimum Tax Raises More Revenues than You Think, or
Much Less, CESIFO WORKING PAPERS No. 9623 (Mar. 7, 2022); Niels Johannesen, The Global Minimum Tax, CENTER FOR
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & INEQUALITY WORKING PAPER 01/22 (Jan. 13, 2022); Shafik Hebous & Michael Keen, ParetoImproving Minimum Corporate Taxation, CESIFO WORKING PAPERS No. 9633 (Mar. 12, 2022).
10
In adopting simple normative criteria (i.e. revenue or national income maximization), the cogency of such
analyses also need to be viewed in light of normative assessments made from non-economic perspectives. For
examples of the latter, see Lennard, supra note 4 (examining the norms of multilateralism); Jinyan Li, The Pillar 2
Undertaxed Payments Rule Departs From International Consensus and Tax Treaties, 174 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 1695
(Mar. 21 2022) (assessing UTPR against existing international legal norms).
11
Noam Noked, The Case for Domestic Minimum Taxes on Multinationals, 174 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 819 (Feb. 7,
2022); Michael P. Devereux, John Vella, & Heydon Wardell-Burrus, Pillar 2: Rule Order, Incentives, and Tax
Competition, OXFORD UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR BUSINESS TAXATION POLICY BRIEF 2022 (Jan. 14, 2022),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4009002.
12
While the IIR can be analogized to familiar anti-deferral rules, and the reasons for and against adopting such
rules are well known, I consider what additional incentives are introduced by Pillar Two.
13
Chris William Sanchirico, Should a Global Minimum Tax be Country-by-Country?, 175 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 549 (Apr.
25, 2022).
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for the UTPR—the component of Pillar Two most likely to be perceived as introducing novel
enforcement mechanisms, and discussion of which has generated perhaps the most confusion. Because
this paper’s findings regarding UTPR adoption may be surprising to some readers, Section II further
discusses potential objections to the assumptions in my analysis. Section III then discusses adoption
incentives for the IIR, while Section IV does the same for QDMT. Section V highlights an important
tension within the OECD’s narratives about whether cooperative or strategic considerations drive Pillar
Two adoption. It then identifies several other features of the OECD political process besides the design
of the GloBE rules that may increase the likelihood of Pillar Two adoption.

I.

The Three Components of Pillar Two: A Schematic Example

The OECD Pillar Two proposal has garnered global attention from policymakers and tax
professionals. Summaries of its main provisions and explanations of technical details are consequently
easy to find. Instead of repeating such summaries, the following schematic example illustrates the main
features and intended effects of Pillar Two’s three components.
Consider four types of countries. First, Countries X and Y host operating subsidiaries of
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and have relatively high corporate income tax (CIT) rates. MNE
subsidiaries in both countries display effective tax rates (ETRs)—as calculated according to the Pillar Two
Model Rules, which starts with book income but allows a number of adjustments—that are above the
Pillar Two minimum of 15%. Second, Country Z also hosts MNE subsidiaries, but imposes a low CIT rate
that, along with perhaps other tax preferences, results in ETRs lower than 15% among MNE subsidiaries.
Third, Country U is a large economy and hosts MNE headquarters (referred to in Pillar Two as ultimate
parent entities or UPEs). Country U offers tax incentives to the operations of both domestic and foreign
MNEs, such that many MNE group companies operating there have ETRs below 15%. Fourth and finally,
a tax haven country H hosts holding companies in MNEs groups (referred to in Pillar Two as
intermediate parent entities or IPEs), which are subject to ETRs of close to 0%. Countries X, Y, Z, U, and H
are representatives of their types, each of which types contains many other members. One can imagine,
for example, X and Y are France and Germany; Z is Ireland or Switzerland; U is the U.S. or China; and H is
Luxembourg, Hong Kong, or Bermuda.
Pillar Two only applies to certain large MNEs: in particular, covered MNE groups must exceed a
EUR 750 million annual revenue threshold, must not be excluded entities (e.g. investment funds), and
must not be from the exempted industries (e.g. shipping).14 Controlled entities within the covered MNE
groups are referred to as Constituent Entities or CEs, and CEs with ETRs below 15%—which in the above
example can be found in countries Z, U and H—are considered low-tax CEs or LTCEs.
We can now describe Pillar Two’s three main components. The GLoBE rules are intended to
ensure that a covered MNE group bears a minimum 15% of ETR in each jurisdiction in which it operates.
One way to achieve this outcome is through the application of the IIR. Suppose an MNE group (M) has
its UPE, P, in Country U; has operating subsidiaries in Countries X and Y; and has an LTCE in Country Z. If
U, as the “UPE” jurisdiction, adopts the IIR, it would impose a “top-up” tax on P, corresponding to the
difference between the 15% minimum ETR required by Pillar Two and the actual ETR displayed by the
14

A similar revenue threshold used for country-by-country reporting under the OECD’s previous Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (BEPS) project covered close to 6,000 MNEs around the world, OECD, OECD CORPORATE TAX STATISTICS,
at 36 (3d ed. July 29, 2021), https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/corporate-tax-statistics-third-edition.pdf.
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Country Z LTCE.15 The top-up tax imposed on P in Country U but in respect of the Country Z CE, along
with any Country Z tax already imposed on that LTCE, would ensure that the Country Z CE’s profit is
subject to an aggregate minimum 15% rate.
Figure 1: Illustrative Example of Country Types

Suppose Country U does not adopt the IIR. This would mean that the Country Z CE still enjoys a
lower-than-15% ETR. Pillar Two envisions two types of remedies. First, if P holds the Country Z LTCE
through a holding company in Country H, and if Country H adopts the IIR, Country H would impose a
top-up tax on that IPE in respect of the undertaxed profit of the Country Z CE. That is, Country H can
substitute for Country U in imposing the IIR. Second, if Country H also fails to adopt the IIR, Country X or
Country Y, or the two collectively, can step in and impose the UTPR in respect of the under-taxed profit
of the Country Z CE. They would collect a top-up tax from the Country X or Country Y operations of M
corresponding to the tax that was not paid in Country Z.
While the IIR can raise the aggregate ETR of an LTCE outside the UPE jurisdiction to 15%, it is not
designed to do so to LTCEs in UPE jurisdictions. This means that M will continue to have LTCEs in Country
U. According to the Pillar Two Model Rules, Country X or Country Y, or both jointly, is allowed to collect
additional top-up taxes in respect of the low-taxed profit of Country U LTCEs by applying the UTPR.16
Such UTPR top-up taxes are to be collected from M’s CEs in Country X and Country Y, respectively.

15

There is a “substance-based carveout” based on tangible assets and payroll in Country Z that reduces the
amount of the top-up tax.
16
Indeed, such Country U LTCE may include P, the ultimate parent entity itself.
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Finally, a QDMT may be adopted by Country Z or Country U. Country Z may adopt a QDMT to
raise the ETR of M’s operating subsidiary located there to 15%. If it does so, Country U would no longer
be allowed to apply the IIR in respect of the Country Z CE (the latter would not be an LTCE). For the
same reason, Country X or Y would no longer be allowed to impose a UTPR top-up tax on the CEs
located in them in respect of the profit of the Country Z CE. Country Z could also have precluded the
application of IIR or UTPR with respect to the MNE subsidiary operating in it by raising the general CIT or
cut back tax preferences. However, the QDMT allows Country Z to avoid such general policy changes, by
offering a more targeted response to IIR or UTPR imposition. Similarly, Country U could apply a QDMT to
raise the ETRs of LTCEs operating in it to the 15% minimum, thereby precluding the application of UTPR
in Country X or Y in respect of Country U CEs.
Two preliminary remarks should be made regarding the above example. First, the example
describes IIR and UTPR as applying in the absence of any profit shifting. One need not assume, for
example, that profits are being shifted out of Countries X, Y, Z or U through tax avoidance and tax
planning. Low ETRs may characterize CEs of MNE groups simply because of different tax rates and
policies of the different countries. The implementation of the global minimum tax may reduce MNEs’
incentives to engage in tax avoidance, if their profits are subject to a 15% rate no matter where they are
shifted to. But the goal of Pillar Two is not only to change MNE behavior, but also to affect the policies
of nations—as illustrated by potential QDMT adoption.
Second, while I believe the above example accurately captures the intended logic of Pillar Two,
this logic should not be assumed to be intuitive or compelling. Some readers may already find a
coherent story: it may seem obvious that Countries Z and U may be forced to adopt the QDMT in
response to the IIR or UTPR. Other readers, however, may feel that something is missing. The next few
sections will argue that things are indeed missing, but that should not be because the above depiction of
the logic of Pillar Two is inaccurate. Rather, arguments about whether Pillar Two works in terms of
incentives should take the above depiction as a common point of departure.

II.

Incentives for UTPR adoption

I begin the analysis of Pillar Two adoption incentives by considering the UTPR. This choice—as
opposed to starting with the IIR or QDMT—is based on three considerations. First, the UTPR is designed
to incentivize IIR and QDMT adoption, but not as a strategic response to the IIR or QDMT. Among Pillar
Two’s three elements, UTPR adoption is thus least affected by uncertainties about what other countries
will do.17 Second, the UTPR is considered by many as Pillar Two’s most novel aspect. It is therefore
central to assessing the incentives generated by Pillar Two design. Third, the incentives for adopting
UTPR have been the least examined by existing commentary, and as I will argue, both proponents and
critics of the UTPR seem to have mis-interpreted the UTPR’s novelty.

1. UTPR adoption is costly and requires ideological motives
It is essential to get one basic fact about the UTPR right. Consider UTPR adoption by Country X in
Section I’s schematic example. The UTPR requires X to impose a top-up tax on an MNE’s subsidiary in X,
just because the MNE’s subsidiaries in other countries (i.e. Countries Z and U) are subject to low tax on
17

That UTPR adoption represents less of a strategic response to other countries than IIR and QDMT may be hidden
by the fact that, in the OECD’s Pillar Two implementation timeline, UTPRs become effective later than IIRs.

7

their profits. However, unlike parent companies that may be subject to the IIR top-up tax because of
under-taxed profits earned through foreign subsidiaries, the subsidiary in Country X generally has no
direct or indirect ownership of, control over, or access to the profits of, other subsidiaries in the same
MNE group. Country X’ UTPR thus can only be levied on the inputs, outputs, or profits in the MNE’s
operations in X. What the UTPR thus requires X to do is to tax the MNE subsidiary in itself more heavily
when subsidiaries of the same MNE are taxed lightly elsewhere.
This, at least, is how the UTPR is explicitly designed. The UTPR does not entitle an adopting
country to make CEs in other countries legally liable for the top-up tax it imposes. The same can be said
about the IIR, of course, but the difference is that the IIR adopting country levies a tax on a taxpayer—P
in our example—that has access to the profits of CEs in other countries as ultimate owner. By contrast,
the UTPR affects CEs in other countries at most in an indirect way. When Country X applies a top-up tax
to P’s Country X CE, it immediately imposes a penalty in P’s investment in Country X. It does also reduce
the value of tax savings elsewhere: $1 of “under-taxation” of profits (e.g. through tax incentives) in
Country Z, for example, directly leads to $1 of penalty (the UTPR top-up tax) in Country X. Nonetheless,
the penalty is in the first place borne by P’s operation in Country X.
Surprisingly, many discussions of the UTPR perpetuate the idea that the UTPR gives the adopter
country a right to dip into a pot of undertaxed profit when other countries fail to adequately tax such
profit. Such an understanding may have made sense when the UTPR was designed as an under-taxed
payment rule: if Country X refrains from taxing a payment made from it because of the expectation that
the payment would be sufficiently taxed in the recipient country, then a rule that allows Country X to tax
such payment when the recipient country fails to adequately tax it shifts the tax base back to Country
X.18 As Section I noted, however, the UTPR in the Pillar Two Model Rules may apply even in the absence
of profit shifting or tax arbitrage.
The idea that UTPR adoption provides costless access to profit elsewhere can be found in
arguments made by both proponents19 and critics20 of Pillar Two, as well as in many professional
exegeses of Pillar Two mechanics. An example of the latter is the interpretation of the allocation of topup tax amounts among UTPR-adopting jurisdictions. In the Pillar Two Model Rules, if a certain amount of
top-up tax is identified for an LTCE in Country Z, if the UPE jurisdiction fails to impose an IIR, and if
Countries X and Y, where MNE’s other subsidiaries are located, both adopt the UTPR, then Countries X
and Y can each collect a top-up tax amount with respect to the under-taxed profit of the Country Z LTCE.
The top-up tax amount is allocated among X and Y in proportion to the tangible assets and payroll of the
MNE subsidiaries in X and Y. If Country X does not collect the UTPR top-up tax, it “loses” the UTPR
percentage to Country Y: Y “gets” to collect the entire top-up tax. Some commentaries have suggested

18

This characterization may apply to the subject-to-tax rule under Pillar Two, to anti-hybrid rules under BEPS
Action 2, and to anti-tax-arbitrage rules in general. However, the possibility of profit shifting from Country X may
sometimes be a pre-condition for investment in X: in such cases anti-arbitrage rules have the same negative effect
on investment as raising tax rates.
19
See, e.g., Lamer supra note 6 (EU official claiming that countries failing to implement the IIR before other
countries implement the UTPR would lose tax revenue to such other countries).
20
Li, supra note 10 (suggesting that the UTPR is a tax sharing rule that “effectively shift” tax bases from some
countries to others).
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that this aspect of Pillar Two design incentivizes countries to adopt UTPR,21 because not doing so would
leave money on the table.
This is an outright illusion. Neither Country X nor Country Y has access to the profit earned by
the LTCE in Country Z (or to the profit earned in each other). All they can do is to tax (more heavily) the
profit (or input or output) of the MNE subsidiary that they each host. But they could always have done
that. Doing so does not become less costly for either country by pretending that the additional tax on
local operations is actually a tax on under-taxed profits elsewhere, or that it is “precluding” some other
country from taxing their local operations more heavily. The narrative that one would be a “sucker” if
one does not adoption UTPR (and “surrenders” one’s UTPR percentage to others) relies on such
pretense, but since the pretense is groundless, the narrative is incoherent.
Once the illusion of a sudden, new access to tax bases elsewhere is dispelled, it becomes clear
that adopting the UTPR is not a dominant strategy (i.e. a sensible thing to do regardless of what other
countries do). Again, the UTPR requires the adopting country to tax the MNE subsidiary in itself more
heavily when subsidiaries of the same MNE are taxed lightly elsewhere. If this were generally a rational
thing to do, there would have been no tax competition. Instead, it seems that for it to be rational for a
country to adopt the UTPR, both of two things have to be true. First, the country must have sufficiently
strong preferences regarding MNEs’ ETRs in other countries. Second, the UTPR must be effective in
bringing about outcomes that satisfy these preferences.
The particular preference required for UTPR adoption may be a preference that the ETRs of
LTCEs in other countries increase, or that they increase as a result of changes such other countries’ tax
law and policy. It seems that such preference would also need to be present even if other countries’ tax
policies have no direct impact on the UTPR-adopting country’s own revenue (or national income). This
desire must moreover be sufficiently strong that the country is willing to act on it, even if by imposing a
heavier tax burden on the MNE operations it hosts than it would have in the absence of this “otherregarding” desire.22 Such a preference is perhaps best thought of as ideological in nature, and as distinct
from other considerations of national welfare. Preferences of this kind certainly have not featured in
standard analyses of international taxation before. Even if they seem to capture political sentiments in
some countries now, one may wonder how enduring they will turn out to be. Moreover, how widely
shared such ideological preference is among nations that participate in Pillar Two is also open to
question.23 But if the required ideological preference is not widely shared, then UTPR adoption should
be relatively rare.
Nonetheless, I will assume that the ideological preference characterizes some countries that
advocate Pillar Two adoption. Even then, however, the preference does not directly dictate UTPR
adoption: UTPR adoption is rational, even given this peculiar preference, only if UTPR can effectively

21

KPMG, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK BEPS AGREEMENT- POLICY PERSPECTIVES (last visited June 10, 2022),
https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2021/12/inclusive-framework-beps-agreement-20-december2021.html.
22
It is commonly assumed that tax rate increases in one country have positive externalities for other countries (by
driving investment away from the former country). In this sense, countries always prefer other countries to raise
tax rates. However, this is not an “other regarding” preference.
23
Consider, for example, the UK, Canada and Japan, three G7 countries that are among the leading sponsors of the
2021 OECD tax deal. In these countries’ international tax policies prior to 2021, there is little evidence that they
promoted high corporate tax rates in other countries.
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induce other countries to change their tax law and increase the ETR of the CEs they host. When might
such conditions hold?

2. Conditions for UTPR success
Suppose Country X is interested in making Country Z raise tax rates, reduce tax incentives, or
otherwise ensure that MNEs’ CEs in Z are subject to a minimum 15% ETR. X applies the UTPR to the
Country X subsidiaries of MNEs that also operate in Country Z. For a given MNE, M, the top-up tax X
imposes makes investment in X less attractive, but it also reduces the worth of tax incentives in Z. The
question then becomes: under what conditions would M prefer not being subject to $1 of UTPR in X to
being given $1 of tax benefit in Z? This is an important question: M may not prefer being relieved of the
UTPR in X—it may rather pay tax in X than in Z, or it may be indifferent between paying $1 of tax in X or
Z. In such cases, it is not clear what Country Z gains by raising taxes in response to Country X’s UTPR.
When might M prefer paying tax in Z rather than in X? This seems to make sense when—and
only when—M’s investment in X is less elastic with respect to tax than its investment in Z. By elasticity, I
mean how much less (more) M is willing to invest in X given a small increase (decrease) in X’s tax rates.24
When such relative elasticities hold, M bears more of the burden of X’s top-up tax than it enjoys the
benefit of tax incentives in Z. It would thus prefer giving up tax benefits in Z in exchange for eliminating
the UTPR liability in X.
To make the hypothesis of such a channel realistic, it helps to postulate in addition that as a host
of relatively inelastic investments, Country X did not impose the revenue-maximizing level of tax: this is
because the inelasticity of MNE investment in X means that X always could have taxed MNEs more. But
perhaps X is willing to forebear such imposition,25 and it is only the incentive to make MNEs pay more
tax elsewhere that motivates X to impose a higher level of tax (which it is willing to remove once MNEs
paid more tax elsewhere).
This potential channel for UTPR effectiveness invites at least three questions. First, when would
it be generally true for X to host more inelastic investments than investments in low tax countries?
Second, when is collective UTPR adoption beneficial for adopting countries? And third, why should
Country Z do anything—why should it not just allow any MNE impacted by X’s UTPR to forego tax
benefits in Z, instead of generally increasing ETRs for all MNEs operating in Z by increasing tax rates,
curtailing tax preferences, and so on?

a. Average relative elasticities

24

Note that in the discussion below, unless specifically stated, elasticity characterizes decisions to vary the amount
of investment depending on tax rate changes—variations on the intensive margin. If X’s tax rate is high enough, M
may also decide not to invest in X at all, given fixed costs. However, the argument below depends not on M’s
response to X’s UTPR on such extensive margin of investment. Because of relative elasticities on the intensive
margin, M may decide to continue to invest in X, but still prefer to pay tax there instead of in Z. That is sufficient to
render X’s UTPR ineffective.
25
It is not clear what would have motivated such forbearance. One possibility is that it may help sustain an
international norm by which no country taxes MNE investments at the revenue maximizing level. In any case, this
assumption implies that UTPR adoption may well raise revenue.
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Consider the following answer to the first question. UTPR-imposing countries are likely to be
high tax countries, and the fact that they are high-tax countries may suggest that investments in them
are less sensitive to taxation. The opposite might be said of the low tax countries in which MNEs
operate—they may have low tax rates because they host on average more elastic investments. Is this
plausible? Referring to the hypothetical example above, some may believe that investments in France
and Germany are on average less elastic than investments in Ireland, but how do they compare to
investments in the U.S. and China?
At best, one might hypothesize that the UTPR can be effective for Country X to adopt if MNE
investment in X is significantly more inelastic, on average, than MNE investment in countries where
MNE operations enjoy low ETRs. This argument is based on average investment elasticities. It does not
suggest that all MNE investments in X are more inelastic than MNE investments in Z. Wherever
investments in X are more elastic than investment in Z, the MNE’s response to the UTPR is to reduce
investment in X, rather than pay more tax in Z. Here, it is worth noting that the application of UTPR
cannot discriminate between countries and investments, especially if it is untied from payment.

b. Does joint adoption help?
As to the second question, the benefit of joint UTPR adoption may come from two distinct
channels. First, the elasticity of investment may be an increasing function of the effective tax rate: the
higher the tax rate, the more elastic the investment response. For a given amount of top-up tax
associated with an LTCE elsewhere, if that amount is shared among UTPR-adopting countries, then the
top-up tax applied by each country is lower, which could make the UTPR more effective by keeping
investment response in the low elasticity range. Yet this is an awkward argument: nothing in Pillar Two
requires a UTPR country to apply the maximum amount of top-up tax allowed by the UTPR. The UTPR
rules set a cap on the top-up tax that may be applied, not a floor. Therefore, a UTPR country could
always unilaterally adjust the UTPR tax and not apply it when it bears on investments outside the
effective range of elasticities.26
Second, the more countries adopt the UTPR, the fewer choices MNEs have for escaping the
UTPR by moving investment to UTPR-free locations. MNEs’ elasticity at the extensive margin is thus
reduced for each UTPR country. However, the more countries adopt UTPR, the fewer there are also of
low-tax countries: the elasticity of investment in such countries may also diminish, which could offset
the decrease in investment elasticity in UTPR-adopting countries. The benefits of joint adoption may
therefore be ambiguous. Nonetheless, if low tax countries far outnumber UTPR adopting countries, then
the few countries that would adopt the UTPR may benefit from joint adoption.
Despite these potential benefits of joint adoption, it is worth noting that joining a UTPR-coalition
does not benefit any country that already has higher average MNE investment elasticity than the
countries (such as Country Z) hosting LTCEs. Suppose Country Y is such a country. Y would not have been
in a position to adopt an effective UTPR on its own. If Y joins a UTPR coalition, some UTPR percentage
26

Moreover, the presence of other UTPR-adopting countries may also increase the elasticity of investment for a
given UTPR-adopting country. This is because if other countries adopt UTPR, the UTPR percentage allocated to X
will depend on the level of tangible assets and employees in X (relative to tangible assets and employees in other
UTPR adopting countries). An MNE could reduce its UTPR liability in X by reducing tangible assets or employment
(but possibly only to increase its UTPR liability elsewhere). If no other country adopts UTPR, by contrast, the MNE
would not be able to reduce its UTPR liability in X, unless it terminates operation in X altogether.
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would be allocated to it. But the MNE would prefer paying UTPR in Y to giving up an equal dollar amount
of tax benefits in Country Z, since by assumption, the MNE bears a lower share of the tax increase in Y
than the share of tax benefits it enjoys in Z. Y’s adoption of UTPR therefore would not be effective.
Therefore, not all countries interested in adopting the UTPR can benefit from joint adoption.

c. Why should low tax countries respond?
The third question is even more critical for understanding the conditions of UTPR effectiveness.
From the perspective of Country Z that hosts LTCEs, only some MNEs may be subject to UTPR: this
depends on in which other countries the MNEs operate, and whether any of them adopts UTPR. In
addition, only some of the investments in Z may be characterized by higher elasticity than investment in
UTPR-adopting jurisdictions.27 For other MNEs and investments, the taxpayers may prefer not to give up
the tax benefits Z offers. Z should therefore hesitate to change its tax laws for all MNEs within Pillar
Two’s scope.
Moreover, those MNEs that prefer giving up Country Z’s tax benefits may simply cease to
respond to Z’s tax incentives. But it does not follow that it would be rational for Z to raise taxes on such
MNEs and investments, given that, by hypothesis, the tax burden would mostly not be borne by the
MNEs, but by less elastic factors such as local labor.28 This all suggests that while the UTPR may succeed
in reducing MNEs’ drive to aggressively reduce their ETRs in other countries, it may not succeed in
making other countries change their tax laws.
This last argument may appear to be contradicted by pronouncements from the U.K., Swiss and
Irish governments in early 2022, indicating that they are considering imposing top-up taxes on domestic
LTCEs in anticipation of other countries’ imposition of UTPRs.29 Such statements appear to imply that
even the expectation of UTPR is already leading some countries to change their tax law in reaction. But
it is important to understand the reasoning offered by these governments. Some assert that by imposing
a top-up tax on domestic LTCEs, LTCE host countries can help MNEs reduce the “compliance burden”
associated with UTPRs. It is not clear, though, why there is room for significant compliance burden
reduction.30 More importantly, the Swiss government suggested that while top-up taxes imposed on
domestic LTCEs can raise local ETRs and eliminate UTPR liability elsewhere, Swiss cantons can find other
ways to compete and make their jurisdictions attractive to foreign investors. While unclear what this
entails, one interpretation is that the intended response to UTPR is some kind of work-around such that,
27

This is especially true of CEs in large economies like the U.S. and China benefitting from tax incentives.
Country Z could always have taxed such inelastic factors more, just as the UTPR jurisdiction could always have
taxed inelastic investments there more.
29
Government of the United Kingdom-HM Treasury, OECD PILLAR 2- CONSULTATION ON IMPLEMENTATION (Jan. 11, 2022),
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/oecd-pillar-2-consultation-on-implementation; Stephanie Soong
Johnston, Ireland Ponders Adopting Pillar 2 Domestic Minimum Top-Up Tax, TAX NOTES (May. 27, 2022),
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/corporate-taxation/ireland-ponders-adopting-pillar-2domestic-minimum-top-tax/2022/05/27/7djcd?highlight=ireland%20and%20pillar; Mindy Herzfeld, Country-by
Country Strategies for Implementing Pillar 2, 175 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 1005 (May 16. 2022), The pronouncements
make clear that such top-up taxes are motivated not just by IIR adoption and would be applied to LTCEs with
foreign parents even if the parent jurisdictions do not impose IIRs.
30
Any top-up tax assessed by a UTPR country with respect to LTCEs elsewhere will require calculations based on
Pillar Two rules that would presumably also be required in the assessment of the top up tax in the LTCE
jurisdiction.
28
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nominally, MNEs are subject to higher levels of taxation, but they are compensated by new (possibly
non-tax) forms of benefits.
This raises the question of whether the countries considering UTPR adoption would view this
kind of response to UTPR as satisfying their objectives. For example, it is possible that the ideological
motivation underlying UTPR adoption is a specific preference for subsidy competition over tax
competition.31 If that is the case, then UTPR may be viewed as effective if it suppresses tax competition
while fanning subsidy competition. If, however, the motivation underlying UTPR adoption is to more
broadly “level the playing field” for businesses by removing government preferences (whether through
tax reductions or subsidies), then the “work-around” response to UTPR should be seen as rendering
UTPR ineffective. It should therefore erode incentives for UTPR adoption.
To summarize: the conditions under which UTPR can effectively induce other countries to raise
tax rates are narrow. The crucial question for UTPR effectiveness is whether, facing a choice between a
top-up tax liability in the UTPR-adopting jurisdiction and a tax of equal amount in the previously-low-tax
jurisdiction, how MNEs respond. For MNEs that prefer paying tax in the UTPR jurisdiction (e.g. because
they can shift more of the tax burden there), the UTPR would not be effective in raising ETRs elsewhere.
The UTPR also may fail to be effective if MNEs are indifferent between the two options. Finally, even if
MNEs prefer paying more tax in the previously-low-tax jurisdiction, it is not clear that such a jurisdiction
should actively respond with tax policy changes. Both the unusual nature of the ideological preference
underlying UTPR adoption, and the narrow scenarios for UTPR success, imply that the rationality of
UTPR adoption is far from obvious.32

3. Is IIR adoption likely to respond to UTPR?
The most natural application of the preceding arguments is to the issue of whether countries
hosting LTCEs would adopt the QDMT to respond to other countries’ UTPR adoption.33 This aspect of
potential strategic interactions among countries emerging from Pillar Two’s design has attracted special
attention because of the pronouncements of the UK, Switzerland and Ireland in 2022, which give early
emphasis to QDMT adoption: the pronouncements may have lent credibility to the UTPR’s effectiveness.
It is also a natural interpretation of the claim that the UTPR is a “back-stop” to the IIR: the UTPR comes
into effect where IIR fails. Yet some commentators may have believed that the UTPR is intended,
31

See Noam Noked, From Tax Competition to Subsidy Competition, 42 U. PA. J. INT’L L 445 (Apr. 17, 2020). The workarounds must be sufficiently effective—giving businesses sufficient benefits without incurring much higher costs
for the government—for them to be rational substitutes for tax preferences.
32
One might say that whether the UTPR can be effective crucially depends on the nature of the ideological motives
underlying UTPR adoption. If the motivating preference is for MNEs to reduce aggressive tax planning, then UTPR
may be effective even if other governments do not respond. Some countries may therefore rationally adopt UTPR
conditional on having such preferences. If, however, the motivating preference is to force other countries
generally to refrain from offering incentives to attract businesses, it may or may not be successful. Adoption
incentives should then be mitigated by the risk of failure. If, finally, the motivating preference is simply to invite
some countries to switch from some combinations of tax and subsidy competition to other combinations, then
again UTPR may be effective. Without knowing exactly which combinations of tax and subsidy competition are
unacceptable and which are tolerated, however, it would also be difficult to assess the strength of the adoption
incentives.
33
The arguments would hold true for both countries hosting LTCEs of foreign multinationals (e.g. Country Z) and
those hosting LTCEs of domestic multinationals (e.g. Country U). See infra, Section IV.
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perhaps even primarily, to generate incentives for IIR adoption. Does the UTPR have such effect?
Referring to the Section I example, the question is: If Countries X and Y adopt the UTPR to collect top-up
tax amounts calculated by reference to the ETR of M’s LTCE in Country Z, should Country U have greater
incentives to impose the IIR in respect of the Country Z LTCE?34
The reasoning supporting an affirmative answer may be the following. While the UTPR top-up
taxes in Countries X and Y merely increase the tax burdens of M’s operations in X and Y, this may be
viewed by Country U as reducing its own national welfare. If U imposes a top-up tax with respect to the
country Z LTCE under the IIR, it would eliminate the Country X and Y top-up taxes under UTPR, while
collect more revenue for itself. The benefit of this course of action is easily understood in terms of
national income maximization.35
But the reasoning here is not as straightforward as it at first appears. Country U can increase its
national income in this scenario only if Country Z does not tax its LTCE more (e.g. through the QDMT). If
Country Z responds to either the UTPR (imposed by X and Y) or the IIR (imposed by U) by raising the
LTCE’s ETR, Country U’s IIR adoption incentives are unaffected by UTPR adoption in X and Y. That is, the
UTPR cannot be effective at the same time in policing low-tax source countries—in the sense of forcing
them to abandon ETR-reducing policies—and policing IIR adoption in UPE countries. Any effect the UTPR
has in policing IIR adoption would be neutralized by other responses (e.g. the QDMT) to IIR adoption. In
other words, UTPR adoption may incentivize IIR adoption only if jurisdictions like Country Z fail to
respond to both the UTPR and IIR. This scenario is certainly possible, but it presupposes the
ineffectiveness of other incentive mechanisms contemplated by Pillar Two designers.36
Fundamentally, the problem here is that while the purported incentive effect of UTPR on IIR
adoption works through national income maximization, a country that aims to maximize national
income should not generally prefer that other countries levy high taxes on the operations of its own
MNEs. Such a country should be averse to IIR adoption, if QDMT adoption is an anticipated response to
the IIR. Anyone who takes the incentives effects of UTPR on the IIR adoption seriously, therefore, ought
to be very skeptical about IIR adoption incentives that deviate from national income maximization. But
commentators who assume the effectiveness of the UTPR seem to give no less credence to the
(independent) likelihood of IIR and QDMT adoption. They do not, that is, reject incentives for IIR
adoption that are incompatible with national income maximization. This suggests that they are not
taking the incentive effects of the UTPR on IIR adoption too seriously.

4. Limits to access to foreign tax bases
The arguments in this Section critically depend on the observation that the UTPR does not give
adopting countries access to any new tax base beyond the input, output or profit of MNE operations
within themselves. This observation is supported by the text of the Pillar Two Blueprint and Pillar Two
34

Some may hold that no country would adopt the UTPR without adopting the IIR. As discussed in Section III infra,
because IIR adoption may be complementary among nations, one country’s IIR adoption already increases another
country’s IIR adoption incentives. The question here, though, is whether countries may be incentivized to adopt IIR
because of UTPR adoption by others, independent of the effect of others’ IIR adoption.
35
If MNEs’ choice of HQ countries is less elastic than their choice of where to establish foreign operations, then
MNEs may prefer to pay the top-up tax in Countries X and Y rather than Country U. But even if this is the case,
Country U may prefer to impose the tax from its own perspective.
36
For example, it presupposes that the IIR would not incentivize other countries to raise tax rates.
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Model Rules. But it conflicts with interpretations of the UTPR—advanced by proponents and critics of
the UTPR alike—that portray the UTPR as offering new extraterritorial taxing rights. This gap between
the text and the interpretation of the UTPR raises two questions. First, does the gap matter—what if the
design of UTPR did allow countries to collect tax from foreign entities? Second, if the gap matters, how
did the gap arise—how did a rather obvious point (namely that the UTPR-imposing jurisdiction can only
collect tax from MNE operations in itself, it does not dip into a collective pot of MNE profit) escape so
many commentators?
The first question essentially asks what if, in the hypothetical example above, Countries X and Y
are allowed by the GLoBE rules to collect the UTPR top-up tax from M’s CEs in Country Z and Country U.
Some critics of the UTPR write as though the UTPR essentially does so, and that this is what is
objectionable about the UTPR—its extraterritorial reach is inconsistent with existing tax treaty (and
other international legal) norms.37 But what if, counterfactually, the GLoBE actually did what these
critics claim it does: aside from qualms about the breach of traditional international legal norms, could
countries’ behavior be expected to change?
One view is that even if one disregards existing legal norms, no country can really access a global
pot of profit and tax more than the input, output or profit associated with MNE investments in itself.
Taxation without nexus is not only norm-violating; it is also futile. Giving countries the “right” to tax
MNE profits without sufficient nexus (i.e. in excess of the extent of economic presence in the countries)
does not confer any effective benefit on them. Thus, Pillar Two’s design cannot be improved—the
UTPR’s incentive effect cannot be enhanced—even by changing the norms of extraterritorial taxation.
This view holds some appeal in itself. It certainly doesn’t seem right to pretend that the only
constraint on a country’s taxing power is what other countries allow it to tax—that as long as countries
collectively have access to a given tax base (e.g. all MNEs in the world), how much of the tax base a
particular country has access to is purely a matter of political agreement. Such a pretense also seems
inconsistent with the assumptions of the analysis offered in this paper. The analysis assumes that
countries act strategically as opposed to cooperatively in Pillar Two adoption. Potential adopters of the
UTPR can at best induce other countries to raise tax rates (or impose the IIR) through MNE responses to
UTPR adoption. They cannot influence other countries by offering to cede profits that they themselves
are unable to collect from MNEs in the first place.
However, the view that taxation without nexus is not only illegitimate but also futile challenges
not only the design of Pillar Two, but also other international tax reform proposals (e.g. new proposals
for formulary apportionment). Perhaps some would reject this view, and hold that just as the norms of
extraterritorial taxation should not be taken as exogenously given, the degree to which countries act
strategically as opposed to cooperatively should also not be taken as given. That is, proposals of taxation
without nexus may postulate a much stronger degree of international cooperation than is consistent
with analyses in terms of strategic incentives.38

37

See Li, supra note 10; Angelo Nikolakakis, Bait and Switch — A Reply to Casey Plunket, 175 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 256
(Apr. 11, 2022).
38
See Mitchell Kane & Adam Kern, Progressive Formulary Apportionment: The Case for ‘Amount D,’ 102 TAX NOTES
INT’L 1483 (June 14, 2021) (proposing a type of formulary apportionment, whereby profit allocations are based on
novel criteria such as countries GDP per capita, that clearly assumes a cooperative setting).

15

As noted earlier, however, the idea that countries may embrace Pillar Two based on strategic
considerations has been relied on by many advocates of Pillar Two (e.g. whenever they warn potential
non-participants about “leaving money on the table”). The assumptions of strategic interaction are not
just arbitrarily imposed: they are internal to the Pillar Two discourse. This highlights the second question
mentioned at the outset of this subsection: how did many commentators seem to ignore the fact that
the UTPR does not create access to new foreign tax bases? One answer is that the OECD itself has
consistently promoted readings of the GLoBE rules that project a narrative of cooperation. When such a
narrative is unreflectively accepted, it becomes tempting to assume that countries are cooperating
under Pillar Two even to an extent that non-cooperative limits on access to foreign tax bases are
relaxed. The fact that even critics of the UTPR assume that the UTPR entitles adopting countries to tax
foreign CEs (which is not possible unless very extensive cooperation is implied), when the UTPR
evidently does not do so, is perhaps a testimony to the effectiveness of the OECD’s narrative. Section V
below will further examine this narrative.
In summary, this section has argued that one should be skeptical about UTPR adoption
incentives for three reasons:
1. UTPR adoption does not give countries access to new tax bases. It is costly and requires
countries to harbor policy objectives that are not standardly attributed to them.
2. QDMT adoption is a rational response to other countries’ UTPR adoption only under special
circumstances that cannot be generally presumed to be present. The potential ineffectiveness of
the UTPR in inducing QDMT adoption should also erode the former’s adoption incentives.
3. IIR adoption may be a rational response to UTPR adoption if nations are assumed to maximize
national income. But this assumption undermines other narratives about the why countries
should adopt IIR—and is incompatible with the special motives required for UTPR adoption.
The basic problem with the UTPR, therefore, is not (just) that it was introduced into Pillar Two in
an illegitimate way or that it is inconsistent with existing legal norms. It is instead that from a selfinterested perspective, few countries, if any, should be willing to adopt it. It is likely that a neglect of the
first of the foregoing three reasons for skepticism—a casual assumption that the UTPR simply gives
countries a free grab at MNEs’ global profit pool—has led to the neglect of the second and third.

III.

Incentives for IIR adoption

The IIR can be characterized—though, as I argue below, the accuracy of such a characterization
has been diminishing since 2021—as a variant of traditional anti-deferral rules that strengthen
residence-based taxation. As such, the unilateral incentives for and against its adoption are well-known.
Taxing resident companies’ foreign income (including income earned from foreign subsidiaries) may
raise revenue. It is also fair, given that the residence-based corporate-level tax is conventionally
understood as a tool for taxing domestic individual shareholders on the basis of the ability to pay. These
and other policy rationales have led many countries to adopt anti-deferral rules—such as controlled
foreign corporation (CFC) rules and the U.S. Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) regime—
without coordination with others.39 Incentives against adoption may include concerns about
39

Some governments may also be persuaded by arguments that worldwide taxation enhances efficiency: when
combined with deductions for source-country taxes it maximizes national income; when combined with foreign tax
credits, it may maximize global welfare by undoing some of the distortionary effects of source country taxes.
Countries may also adopt such rules for idiosyncratic reasons. For example, the U.S. initially adopted CFC rules to
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administrability, preferences to keep domestic businesses “competitive” in their foreign expansions, and
preferences to attract and keep MNE headquarters.40
This section does not dwell on these familiar incentives but instead focuses on new
(dis)incentives introduced by Pillar Two regarding IIR adoption. Three considerations are highlighted.
First, Pillar Two may create greater incentives for IIR adoption by coordinating collective adoption,
although it is unclear how much coordination itself enhances the incentives. Second, the fact that Pillar
Two gives IPE jurisdictions “the right” to impose IIR if the UPE countries do not offers no new incentive
for IIR adoption by UPE countries. Third, because QDMT adoption has become not only a possible but
even an explicitly encouraged response to the IIR, IIR adoption incentives may need to be
reconceptualized, and different, mutually incompatible incentives have been invoked for IIR adoption.
Overall, these considerations suggest that the enhancement of IIR adoption incentives under Pillar Two
is at best incremental.

1. Additional adoption incentives from coordination
Pillar Two is intended to ameliorate two purported disincentives against strengthening
residence-based taxation. The first postulates that the location of MNE headquarters (HQs) is mobile
and there is competition among countries for MNE HQs. Any country that adopts strong worldwide
corporate taxation regimes may risk losing out in such competition, but if a sufficient number of
countries hosting MNE HQs adopt IIR, the intensity of HQ competition is lowered. The second
disincentive may arise if, even without assuming that HQ location decisions are tax sensitive, the
strength of worldwide corporate taxation affects the “competitiveness” of a country’s MNEs. For
instance, one can view a country’s decision to subject the foreign income of its MNEs to low taxation as
a form of subsidy. Reducing such subsidy by strengthening residence-based taxation may reduce the
competitiveness of one’s own multinationals, but if other countries also strengthen their residencebased taxation, concerns about the disadvantages of strong residence-based taxation are mitigated.
For these reasons, countries may benefit from coordinated strengthening of residence-based
taxation, and Pillar Two may be viewed as offering precisely such coordination. Nonetheless, questions
can be raised about these narratives. For instance, one might expect the number of countries engaged
in HQ competition to be relatively small. If mitigating HQ competition is the goal, such countries could
and should negotiate among themselves to form a small tax cartel, as opposed to enlisting the majority
of countries in the world to adopt the GLoBE rules.41 In theory, the likelihood of broad international IIR
adoption under Pillar Two should be less than the likelihood of collective adoption of strong antideferral rules among a smaller group of countries (such as the G7). It is also worth noting that there is
little past evidence in support of complementarity in the adoption of anti-deferral rules. For example,
the U.S. enacted GILTI in 2017. Outside Pillar Two, however, there are few reports of other countries
adopting stronger anti-deferral rules in reaction to presumably reduced competition from the U.S. and
U.S. multinationals.42
stem capital outflows that destabilized the Bretton Woods system. More recently, it enacted GILTI purportedly to
“bring jobs back to America.”
40
However, the limited scope of Pillar Two (see text accompanying note 14 supra) implies that in many countries
the IIR would co-exist with anti-deferral rules that have wider application.
41
Countries hosting foreign MNE investments may even be hurt by the reduction of subsidies from HQ countries.
42
U.S. multinationals represent at least one quarter of all large multinational in the world.
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2. Incentives from competition for IIR adoption?
Beyond any complementarity in IIR adoption by UPE countries, an important question is
whether Pillar Two’s design introduces additional adoption incentives by creating a competition for IIR
adoption between the UPE jurisdiction and jurisdictions where intermediate holding companies reside.
Although the UPE country has priority in applying the IIR under Pillar Two,43 if a UPE countries fails to
adopt the IIR, the jurisdiction of an intermediate parent entity (IPE) or partially-owned parent entity
(POPE) may apply the IIR and collect revenue that the UPE jurisdiction “foregoes.” In such a case, an
MNE would still be subject to IIR, and benefit little from the failure of IIR adoption by the UPE country.
Does this generate an additional incentive for the UPE country to adopt IIR?
It seems that this incentive is likely to be weak. The location of intermediate holding companies
in current MNE structures is highly tax-sensitive. Such locations (e.g. Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Hong Kong, etc.) are generally chosen because they (i) impose low effective tax on foreign-earned
profits, while (ii) enjoying a large network of tax treaties that can be used to reduce source-country
taxes on payments from operating subsidiaries. By adopting the IIR and imposing top-up taxes on
foreign income, they would eliminate the main reasons why MNEs choose them as locations for
intermediate holding companies. As long as there are sufficiently many other jurisdictions that do not
adopt the IIR, MNEs that are not subject to IIR in their UPE countries would move their intermediate
holding companies to these IIR-free jurisdictions and away from those that adopt IIR. This points to
incentives against IIR adoption on the part of intermediate holding company jurisdictions. Such
disincentives also imply that UPE countries should not fear that, by not adopting IIR, they are leaving
“money on the table” to intermediate holding company jurisdictions.44
This conclusion should not be surprising. Like UPE countries, countries hosting intermediate
holding companies could always have adopted IIR-like rules: indeed, in theory they have stronger
incentives to do so outside Pillar Two because the taxes they impose would be creditable in UPE
jurisdictions, giving them effective “priority” over UPE jurisdictions. That such countries have largely not
adopted anti-deferrals before (while a significant number of UPE countries have) is consistent with the
conjecture that MNE’s decisions as to the location of intermediate holding companies are much more
elastic (even if not perfectly so) than decisions regarding HQ location. While Pillar Two contemplates
that the UPE country’s failure to adopt IIR could be remedied by IIR adoption by IPE jurisdictions, it
provides no new incentives for IIR adoption in IPE jurisdictions. Consequently, UPE countries should also
face no additional incentives for IIR adoption from the fear of “losing priority.”

3. IIR adoption (dis)incentives in anticipation of QDMT and UTPR
Although the idea of the IIR originated from anti-deferral rules, since 2021, it has become
increasingly problematic to interpret the IIR in terms of the policy justifications associated with these
previous rules. This is for two reasons. First, anti-deferral rules are generally a response to—they
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presuppose—the fact that the foreign income of the taxpayers to whom the rules are applied are often
taxed at a low rate. Second, anti-deferral rules also typically incorporate standard foreign tax credit
(FTC) rules, which offer double taxation relief while taking the fact of source country taxation as given.
By contrast, since the OECD’s release of its Economic Impact Assessment of the Pillar Two Blueprint in
2020, and especially since the OECD October 2021 Statement, it has become increasingly common to
assume that Pillar Two adoption will result in countries that previously taxed MNE operations at low
rates raising their tax rates to the global minimum, either through general changes to the corporate
income tax or through QDMT adoption.45 In other words, as a consequence of Pillar Two adoption, the
effective tax rates of many previously low-tax jurisdictions are generally expected to rise. Moreover,
foreign taxes are no longer assumed as given: they specifically adjust to the FTC effectively granted by
IIR countries.
Whether these expectations are correct in fact requires scrutiny (as Section IV will argue). But
regardless of the soundness of such expectations, whether they are held by IIR adopters or not matters
a lot to the interpretation of IIR adoption incentives. To begin with, if low-tax countries’ tax policy
responses are expected, IIR adoption may no longer raise revenue from MNEs’ existing operations. If
revenue is a key consideration—and it appears that many countries still take IIR’s revenue potential to
be an important, even if not the only, consideration46—then the anticipation of source (or haven)
country tax rate increases creates disincentives for IIR adoption. Moreover, the relief of double taxation
through FTC has traditionally been conceived of as a cooperative policy (albeit implemented unilaterally)
that assumes that other countries do not act strategically to enact “soak-up” taxes. However, Pillar Two
now envisions a cooperative policy that specifically encourages other parties to act opportunistically.
Most fundamentally, the idea that countries would adopt the IIR only to subject their own MNEs
to greater taxation in other countries seems to conflict with any supposition that they try to maximize
national income. IIR adoption looks like a kind of action that puts money on the table for other countries
to take: one must better understand why, and which, countries would act this way.
Some commentators may have been inclined to rationalize IIR adoption in terms of traditional
policy objectives by arguing that the direct revenue effect for the residence country is secondary. They
may claim that the most important benefit of IIR is to get source countries to raise their tax rates, so as
to create a floor to tax rate competition. Reduced tax competition would enable high-tax countries to
further raise their tax rates, which would generate revenue, even if the IIR by itself does not directly
generate revenue. However, such an interpretation of IIR adoption incentives is difficult to reconcile
with the actual design of Pillar Two. For example, it has been pointed out that the 15% minimum tax
rate is still substantially lower than the corporate tax rates of many UPE jurisdictions. Profit shifting
incentives to low tax jurisdictions will therefore remain significant after Pillar Two is implemented. This

45
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means that UPE countries’ ability to further raise tax rates (and revenue) will be uncertain, whereas the
loss of national income from the increased foreign taxation of their MNEs is much more certain.47
In short, if low-tax (source or haven) countries are expected generally to raise tax rates to the
global minimum in response to IIR adoption, it would be difficult to rationalize IIR adoption on the basis
of national income maximization. IIR adopters must embrace other policy objectives or principles.48
Regardless of the precise nature of such alternative objectives, the point is that relatively unusual
motivations must be invoked. This immediately raises a question similar to that considered in Section
II.1 in relation to the ideological preference required for UTPR adoption, namely how widespread and
strong such motivations are. Importantly, the answer to this question is also relevant to predicting how
many low-tax countries would respond to IIR adoption. As Section IV discusses, QDMT is a rational
response to IIR adoption if the goal of IIR adopters is to induce QDMT adoption. But if goal of potential
IIR adopters is national income maximization, then QDMT adoption may not be the best strategy.
Finally, recall two findings from Section II: the UTPR-adopting country is likely not a national
income maximizer (Section II.1); and IIR adoption could be a rational response to the UTPR if a country is
national-income-maximizing, but it may not be if a country does not try to maximize national income
(Section II.3). The first finding implies that no country will adopt UTPR opportunistically (i.e. simply
because there is “money on the table”), therefore no country should fear the failure to adopt IIR would
leave money on the table to UTPR adopters. The second finding, together with the arguments in this
section, has two further implications. First, a UPE country that would respond to other countries’ UTPR
by adopting the IIR is unlikely to adopt the UTPR itself, and is also unlikely to adopt the IIR if it expects
wide QDMT adoption. Second, countries that adopt both the UTPR and IIR are unlikely to be national
income maximizers; they are also likely to engage in Pillar Two not in strategic reaction to other
countries, but as leaders.

IV.

Incentives for QDMT Adoption

The QDMT concept was not originally part of Pillar Two design, but appeared for the first time in
the December 2021 Pillar Two Model Rules. Moreover, two types of QDMTs can be distinguished. QDMT
I is imposed by a country on a domestic LTCE of an MNE with a foreign parent (Country Z in Section I).
QDMT II is imposed by a UPE jurisdiction on any LTCEs it hosts, including both the UPE itself and other
domestic subsidiaries (Country U in Section I).49 Initial commentaries suggested that QDMT I adoption
would represent a rational response to IIR and UTPR adoption by other countries,50 and that QDMT II
adoption may be a necessary response on the part of the UPE jurisdiction to UTPR adopted elsewhere.51
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See Johannesen, supra note 9. Janeba & Schjelderup supra note 9 further argue that subsidy competition among
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1. QDMT I adoption in response to the IIR
QDMT I adoption has seemed to many a natural response to widespread IIR adoption. By
imposing top-up taxes on MNEs in respect of their foreign LTCEs pursuant to the IIR, UPE countries that
apply would neutralize the attractions of low tax countries that offer ETRs below 15%. Relative to the
choice of leaving the UPE country to collect the top-up tax, the low tax countries would be better off
collecting such top-up tax themselves, without the fear of losing any investment. While the OECD made
the case for IIR adoption on the basis that it would induce low tax countries to raise source country tax
rates generally, it now seems to accept that such countries may simply apply QDMT I to in-scope MNEs.
However, if the objective is to analyze strategic incentives for Pillar Two adoption—the exercise
pursued in this paper—widespread IIR adoption itself should not be taken as given. Section III showed
that if one starts at a point where the question of whether to adopt IIR is open, Pillar Two design does
little in offering a definitive answer to that question.52 But if only a few UPE countries adopt IIR, while
other UPE countries refrain from doing so, a QDMT-I-adopter would risk losing, to QDMT-I-non-adopting
countries, investments from all MNEs that hail from IIR-non-adopting countries. QDMT I adoption
becomes rational only when sufficiently many UPE countries adopt the IIR.
Yet as discussed in Section III, the expectation of QDMT I adoption reduces the likelihood of IIR
adoption among countries driven by the objective of national income maximization. Not only does
QDMT I eliminate the direct revenue gain from IIR adoption, but if previously low-tax countries would
act strategically to collect "soak-up taxes,” they can also be predicted to pursue aggressive tax
competition for investment from MNEs outside the scope of Pillar Two, as well as non-tax competition
(perhaps even funded by revenue collected through QDMT I) for in-scope MNEs. Both would imply that
the indirect revenue gain from IIR adoption would be highly uncertain. Therefore, QDMT I is rational to
adopt if it is clear that IIR adopters are not national-income maximizers and instead deliberately wish to
put money on the table. But if low-tax countries believe UPE countries are national-income maximizers,
QDMT I adoption is not a safe strategy.
This conclusion may shed light on the striking fact that some of the apparent early movers in
Pillar Two implementation are low tax countries (e.g. Ireland and Switzerland): by emphasizing their
willingness to adopt QDMT I, they may be testing out UPE countries’ commitments to a strategy that is
not national-income maximizing.
It is not clear how this complex interaction between QDMT I and IIR would resolve itself. One
possible intermediate outcome is that some low-tax countries are unable or unwilling to adopt QDMT I.
This provides revenue-based incentives for enough UPE countries to adopt the IIR, which in turns leads
some low-tax countries to adopt QDMT I in response. Meanwhile, MNEs from UPE countries that do not
adopt IIR still find the non-QDMT-adopting countries to be attractive locations. Consequently, both IIR
and QDMT adoption remains partial.
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(emphasis added)).
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2. QDMT I and II adoption in response to UTPR
Section II showed that because UTPR countries cannot generally reach the profit of LTCEs in
other countries, it is an illusion that the failure to adopt QDMT I would “leave money on the table” to
UTPR-adopting countries. Instead, it often would be irrational for a low tax country to respond to the
UTPR adoption elsewhere by adopting QDMT I: this is especially the case if the country hosts many lowelasticity investments and many MNEs not exposed to the UTPR. Further, if QDMT I is used to fund
disguised tax competition or equivalent subsidy competition, it may frustrate the original purpose of
UTPR adoption for some countries, and thus may diminish the likelihood of UTPR adoption. And if not
many countries can be expected to adopt UTPR in the first place, incentives for QDMT I adoption
generated by UTPR is also limited.
Similarly, Section II showed that the adoption of QDMT II by a UPE country is not compelled by
UTPR adoption in other countries. In many cases, investments in the UPE country may be rather
inelastic, and MNEs may well prefer $1 of tax benefit in the UPE country to a $ 1 reduction in the tax
penalty imposed in the UTPR country. Moreover, if a UPE country is large (e.g. the U.S. or China), it may
not even be feasible for UTPR-imposing countries to collect all the top-up tax associated with LTCEs in
the UPE countries. In all of these circumstances, it seems more rational for the UPE countries to
persuade the potential UTPR-adopter countries of the futility of such adoption, than to enact QDMT II in
reaction to UTPR.53

V.

Cooperative Explanations of Pillar Two Adoption

So far, we have considered strategic incentives for Pillar Two adoption. As should be clear from
the previous sections, what marks decisions as strategic is the fact that actors take other parties’ actions
as given in making their own decisions, not the assumption that actors are motivated by what are
conventionally conceived as “self-interested” preferences (such as national income maximization). Even
allowing diverse motivations, however, it seems difficult to find support for the claim that Pillar Two’s
design enhances the likelihood of its adoption by triggering strategic incentives. A major problem is that
Pillar Two seems to make inconsistent assumptions as to when countries act on the basis of nonincome-maximizing objectives. For example, UTPR-adopting countries must be non-income-maximizing,
but they are supposed to expect others to respond to the UTPR in an income-maximizing manner.
Likewise, countries expecting other countries to be income-maximizing would only adopt the IIR if they
themselves are not income-maximizing. And income-maximizing countries would adopt the QDMT only
after ascertaining that other countries are not income-maximizing.
But beyond these inconsistent implicit assumptions about countries’ preferences, the OECD’s
depiction of Pillar Two—in the Pillar Two Blueprint, Pillar Two Model Rules and its Commentary, and
more generally in its pronouncements about the GLoBE rules—displays a more obvious inconsistency, or
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deliberate ambiguity. This is an inconsistency or ambiguity about whether countries are acting
strategically or cooperatively under Pillar Two.
In many ways, and especially up to the point of OECD October 2021 Statement, the discourse
around Pillar Two takes special pains to create a semblance of broad international cooperation, by
depicting actions naturally described as strategic in terms of cooperation instead. For example, a basic
premise of Pillar Two is that countries would apply IIRs on an orderly basis: UPE countries get to apply
them first, IPE countries next, and so on. But this ordering is arguably artificial. IPE jurisdictions have
always had the option to adopt IIR-like rules unilaterally (and would enjoy de facto priority in doing so),
but may have self-interested reasons not to adopt. Pillar Two is apt to portray such choice as
acknowledging UPE countries’ priority, rather than strategic non-adoption.54 Even more obviously,
source countries’ decisions to raise income taxes in response to residence countries’ foreign tax credit
regimes have always been understood (disfavored) as a form of strategic action. Since late 2021,
however, Pillar Two explicitly counts the adoption of QDMT as a form of cooperative action.
Perhaps the clearest example of Pillar Two’s equivocation about what counts as cooperation is
its characterization of the GloBE rules as describing a “common approach”: countries are not required to
adopt the rules, but “if they choose to do so, they will implement and administer the rules in a way that
is consistent with the outcomes provided for under Pillar Two, including in light of model rules and
guidance.” This statement has been widely repeated, but it is almost tautological: what would it mean
for a country to adopt rules sufficiently dissimilar from the OECD’s model but still adopting the “OECD’s”
rules? 55 Under this formulation, it is hard to see how countries can fail to follow the “common
approach”: they would always be treated by the OECD as cooperating.
But the OECD’s pitch of Pillar Two as a cooperative endeavor seems to have shifted after its
October 2021 Statement.56 In pressuring countries to adopt Pillar Two in 2022, the designers of Pillar
Two, whether at the OECD, European Union or the United States, increasingly argue that countries that
fail to adopt Pillar Two would lose out to countries that adopt: only adoption is strategically optimal. The
narrative that countries should adopt the GLoBE rules as a defensive measure to fend off other
countries’ predation on their tax bases has come to dominate. This directly contradicts standard
understandings of cooperation, according to which all would gain from cooperation, and all would lose
from non-cooperation.57
If the previous sections are correct that there is no coherent set of strategic incentives that
would lead to widespread Pillar Two adoption, one should be distrustful of this new turn in the OECD’s
characterization of the proposed global tax agreement. But questioning a prevalent account about the
incentives for Pillar Two adoption is not the same as predicting the course of Pillar Two (non-)adoption.
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Many commentators on Pillar Two, after all, may truly believe (or at least more so than the designers of
Pillar Two themselves) that countries are coming together to support a new international regime, not
strategically out of the desire to defend their own self-interests, but cooperatively to advance nations’
common interests. If countries are genuinely acting cooperatively (again, more so than is implied by the
OECD’s equivocations), an analytical framework in which countries are motivated only by strategic
considerations will likely have poor predictive power.
This brings us to the question of how best to explain the political agreement that 136 nations
are said to have reached in October 2021—whether that agreement in itself offers decisive evidence
against the view that countries act mainly strategically in approaching the new global tax agreement. It
is actually not hard to imagine that the delegates from many of the participating countries in the OECD’s
Inclusive Framework were inclined to behave cooperatively, instead of focusing exclusively on national
self-interests. Many delegates, being bureaucrats from finance ministries and tax administrations, may
have perceived Pillar Two’s main goal to be raising taxes in MNEs. Such a project could both directly
result in revenue gains for some countries and indirectly lend legitimacy to future domestic tax
increases—outcomes that hold common appeal to the professional and career interests of the
delegates. It may also have been difficult to distinguish the goals of the Inclusive Framework from other
mundane goals of OECD tax meetings, such as the provision of technical training to developing
countries.58 All these could discourage a focus on national self-interest.
Nor is this kind of phenomenon—national delegates acting in a cooperative fashion in setting
international tax norms, in seeming disregard of national self-interest—unprecedented. The drafting of
model tax conventions at the League of Nations in the 1920s can be viewed in the same light. At the
League of Nations,59 delegates comprising tax specialists and academics, acting in their personal
capacities, debated about various ways of relieving double taxation and their relations to principles of
inter-nation equity, seemingly in abstraction not only from the self-interest of particular nations but also
from the facts that many of the countries they hailed from were only just beginning to collect income
taxes, had not yet begun to tax corporations, and faced little political pressure to solve the problem of
double taxation. Equitable solutions to the double taxation problem were memorialized without much
attention to what specific tax instruments they would be applied to. This, however, has not prevented
the work of the League of Nations from being viewed as laying the foundations of the architecture of
20th century international taxation. If one believes in such origin attributions, there is no reason to think
that delegates to the Inclusive Framework cannot build a new international tax architecture in a similar
cooperative fashion.
At the present, the main question is whether delegate behaviors at the Inclusive Framework—
even if they were more properly characterized as cooperative rather than strategic—will be predictive of
government decisions in the current stage of Pillar Two implementation. The historical parallel to this
question is whether one could have predicted the actual negotiations of the global bilateral tax treaty
network from the model conventions drafted by the League of Nations. Unfortunately, international tax
scholarship—whether legal, economic, or historical—still sheds little light on these questions.
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